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We study a new evolutionary game, where players are tempted to take part by the premium, but
compete for being the first who take a specific move. Those, who manage to escape the bulk of
players, are the winners. While for large premium the game is very similar to the Minority Game
studied earlier, significant new behavior, reminiscent of spin glasses is observed for premium below
certain level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The transfer of physical ideas and procedures to tradi-
tionally social disciplines and a parallel backflow of inspi-
ration for statistical physics from these disciplines play
an increasing role in the last decade.
Among other applications, the field of econophysics
[1,2] attracted much attention. An impotrant approach
seems to be modelling the collective effect found in eco-
nomic systems by assemblies of individually acting het-
erogeneous agents. One of the basic models is the Mi-
nority game [3,4], an evolutionary game which mimics
the adaptive behavior of agents with bounded rational-
ity, studied by W. B. Arthur in his El Farol bar problem
[5].
In the Minority game, each player faces the choice be-
tween two possibitities, which can be buying or selling
stock, entering or not a business, selecting first or sec-
ond drive and so on. The winning side is that of the
minority of players. Each player posesses a set of S ≥ 2
strategies. Each strategy collects its score, indicating the
virtual gain of the player, if she had played that strategy
all the time. At each round, the playes choose among
their strategies the one with highest score. Such a sort
of an on-line learning and agaptation leads to better-
than-random performance of the system as a whole. It
was found, that the properties of the game depend on
the memory length M and number of players N through
the scaling variable α = 2M/N [4,6,7]. The Minoriry
game was thoroughly studied both numerically and ana-
lytically [8–19] along with the study of the original bar at-
tendance problem [20,21] and various modifications of the
Minority game [22–29] An important role is attributed
to the observation that the dynamics of the memorized
pattern and the strategies’ scores are in certain regimes
decoupled [30–32] and that the thermal noise can ge in-
troduced in the players’ decisions [33–35].
The most intriguging feature is the minimum of volatil-
ity, which occurs for the value α = αc ≃ 0.34 [4,6,7,20].
A phase transition occurs here, the properties of which
are well studied both numerically [36] and analytically
[37–41].
The Minority game is essentially symmetric. The play-
ers can choose between two sides, none of which is a pri-
ori preferred. The situation is somewhat different in the
bar attendance model [20,21], where the optimal atten-
dance is set from outside. There are also variants of thge
game, in which the players can decide to participate or
not, depending on their accumulated wealth [27,39]. The
number of players who influence the outcome of the game
can thus vary in time.
In this work we want to study a more abstract version
of these models with variable number of players. We im-
plement a scheme, in which the players struggle to be
“ahead” of the other players, i. e. to come in before the
others and not to stay if others have already left. This
behavior is relevant in situations, where the early comers
have advantage, irrespectively of what is the direction of
the movement. We can think, for example, of a bunch
of apes exploring a virgin land. The first animal com-
ing to a place finds enough food, but much less is left
for the followers. In an infinite space we could have sta-
tionary movement of the bunch in one dorection. When
the space available is limited, frustration comes into play.
The bunch should oscillate between the borderlines and
no-one can steadily win. Our aim is to formalize and sim-
ulate this situation in a similar manner as the Minority
game formalizes the inductive behavior.
II. ESCAPE GAME
We introduce a new mechanism, which leads to frus-
tration in the agent’s actions. Similarly to the Minority
game, we have N agents. The agents can choose between
two options: to participate (1) or not (0) in the business.
If we denote aj ∈ {0, 1} the action of j’th player, the
attendance is A =
∑
j aj . We measure the success of the
1
j’th player by her wealth Wj . The players who decide to
participate can be either rewarded or punished by cor-
responding change in their wealth, while the wealth of
non-participating agents remains unchanged.
There are two sources of the wealth change. First,
there is a constant influx of wealth into the system,
which we will call premium p. All participating play-
ers receive the amount p/A. Second, we reward the
players, who by some means induce the others to follow
them in the next step. If a player decided to partici-
pate in step t − 1 and the attendance rose from t − 1
to t (i. e. A(t) − A(t − 1) > 0), we consider that the
player was “ahead” of their companions and gets a point.
If, on the other hand the attendance decreased (i. e.
A(t) − A(t − 1) < 0), the player is considered as “be-
hind” and looses a point. If the attendance remains un-
changed, no points are assigned. Thus, each player tries
to “escape” the bulk of the other players. That is why
we nicknamed the present dynamical multi-agent system
“Escape game”.
As in the Minority game, the record is kept about
the past M changes of the attendance, µ(t) = [c(t −
1), c(t − 2), ..., c(t −M)]. We denote c = 1 increase in
A, and c = −1 decrease in A. There are two possibili-
ties how to deal with the case when the attendance does
not change. It is possible to attribute c = 0 to such a
situation; then the state variable will have values from
the set c ∈ {−1, 0,+1}. Alternatively, we can merge the
cases of decrease and no change, so c = −1 also in the
case when the attendance is constant. In this case we dis-
tinguish only two states, c ∈ {−1,+1}. We found, that
both choices give qualitatively similar results, while the
former one leads to slightly more demanding simulations.
Therefore, throughout this article we we will investigate
the latter choice, with two states only.
The agents look at the record µ ∈ {−1,+1}M. They
have a set of S strategies (S = 2 in our simulations). The
s-th strategy of the j-th player prescribes for the record
µ the action aµj,s ∈ 0, 1. For each strategy, the score
is computed, which is the virtual gain of the player, if
she played constantly that strategy. The update of the
strategies’ scores can be written as
Uj,s(t+ 1) = Uj,s(t) + (1)
+a
µ(t−1)
j,s
(
p
A(t− 1)
+G(A(t) −A(t− 1))
)
.
For the function G, weighting the attendance changes, we
use the signum function, G(x) = sign(x). Note that the
delivery of the player’s gain is delayed: the action taken
at time t − 1 can be rewarded anly at time t, so that
it influences the scores at time t + 1. Again with close
analogy to the Minority game, the actions the players
take are prescribed by the strategies with highest score,
aj = aj,sM , where sM denotes the most successfull strat-
egy at the moment, Uj,sM = maxs Uj,s.
To see clearly the points of difference from the Minor-
ity game, note first that in the Escape game the non-
participation aj = 0 cannt change the wealth of the
player. Second, the strategie’s update rule (1) contains
derivative of the attendance, not the attendance itself.
III. EVOLUTION OF ATTENDANCE AND
GLASSY BEHAVIOR
Let us see qualitatively first, what is the time depen-
dence of the attendance. We have found that for large
enough premium the Escape game behaves in very similar
manner to the Minority game. The attendance fluctua-
tions decrease from its initial value until they stabilize
at a stationary value. The average attendance is shifted
from its random value N/2 above, as a response to the
incentive, posed by the premium, for the payers to prefer
presence over absence. We can see in Fig. 1 an example
of such a behavior. The stationary state is reached in a
short time (shorter than 105 steps for N = 200). The
wealth of the most successful player grows constantly at
high rate and also the average wealth slightly grows. This
means, that due to the premium the game is a positive-
sum game on average.
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FIG. 1. Example for the time dependence of the atten-
dance (top frame), the effective number of strategies (bot-
tom frame), and average wealth (middle frame, lower curve)
and maximum wealth among all players (middle frame, upper
curve). The number of players is N = 200, memory M = 5
and premium p = 1.
We can also observe the time dependence of the ef-
fective number of strategies per player eΣ. We define it
2
through the average entropy of the usage of the strate-
gies,
Σ(t) =
1
N
∑
j,s
νj,s(t) log νj,s(t) (2)
where νj,s is the time-averaged frequency of the usage
of s-th strategy of j-th player. We performed the time
averaging over a relatively short window using the expo-
nential weighting, νj,s(t) = (1 − λ)uj,s(t) + λνj,s(t − 1),
where the usage index uj,s(t) = 1 if the player j used the
strategy s at time t, and uj,s(t) = 0 otherwise. We used
λ = 0.99, which corresponds to effective time-window
width 100 steps.
We can see in Fig. 1 that the effective number of
used strategies stabilizes at a value above but close to
1, which also corresponds well to the behavior of the Mi-
nority game in the symmetry-broken phase.
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FIG. 2. The same as in Fig. 1, but for premium p = 0.01.
On the other hand, we can observe significant change
of the behavior of the model, if the premium is decreased
below certain level. An example can be seen in Fig. 2.
First, the transient time before the system settles in a sta-
tionary state is significantly larger (we observed, that it
is nearly 106 steps). Then, we can see that periods with
significant attendance fluctuations are alternating with
periods with constant attendance, which can frequently
last more than 104 steps. The fluctuating periods are
characterized by decrease of the average wealth (the game
is a negative-sum one) and effective number of strategies
larger than 1. On the other hand, the periods of con-
stant attendance exhibit nearly constant average wealth
and effective number of strategies equal to 1. It means,
that within the constant periods the system is able to
find a favorable configuration, in which the game is glob-
ally effective (avoids the losses due to fluctuations) and
everybody is stuck at single strategy. Moreover, there
are many of such states: in different constant periods the
attendance may differ considerably.
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FIG. 3. The same as in Fig. 1, but for premium p = 0.001.
This behavior is further pronounced when we dimin-
ish the premium even more. We can see such a behav-
ior in Fig. 3. We can observe long periods (sometimes
longer than 105 steps) of constant attendance, separated
by very short fluctuating periods. The effective number
of strategies differs from 1 only during these short peri-
ods. Again, there are many configurations in which the
attendance does not change for long time.
The situation is reminiscent of spin glasses. In the spin
glass behavior, there are many states, stable for long
time, but mutually very different, in which the system
can stay. If the bariers between these states are not in-
finite (which happens only in the fully connected case in
thermodynamic limit), the dynamics of such a system is
very similar to our Escape game: long periods of stasis
within one state, interrupted by short periods corespond-
ing to the jumps from one state to another.
Therefore, we can describe the behavior with changing
premium p as a kind of transition from “paramagnet”
(high p) to “spin-glass” phase (low p). We have not stud-
ied in detail the phase diagram. However, we observed,
that with fixed N the transition occurs at smaller p if the
memory is longer.
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IV. TIME-AVERAGED ATTENDANCE AND ITS
FLUCTUATIONS
The response of the player’s assembly to the premium
was measured by the average attendance. Its dependence
on the value of premium is shown in Fig. 4. As expected,
it is an increasing function. We can see, that shorter
memory leads to more strong response to the premium.
The value of p at which the average attendance crosses
its random value N/2 is smaller for shorter memory.
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FIG. 4. Average attendance for N = 200 and memory
length M = 5 (×) andM = 7 (◦). The data are averaged over
50 independent runs. Each run was 106 steps long and the
average was taken over 5 · 105 last steps. Where not shown,
the error bars are smaller than symbol size.
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FIG. 5. Attendance fluctuations for N = 200 and memory
length M = 5 (×) andM = 7 (◦). The data are averaged over
50 independent runs. Each run was 106 steps long and the
average was taken over 5 · 105 last steps. Where not shown,
the error bars are smaller than symbol size.
The dependence of the attendance fluctuations σ2 on
p is shown in Fig. 5. Again, the dependence on p is
more pronounced for shorter memory. The minimum,
which is located around p = 3 for N = 200 is probably
connected with the transition from the “paramagnet” to
“spin-glass” phase: for low p the fluctuations are mainly
due to rare but large jumps of the attendance from one
quasi-static value to another. Indeed, we observed qual-
itatively that the transition occurs somewhat below the
position of the minimum in σ2.
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FIG. 6. Average attendance fluctuations for N = 200 and
premium p = 10 (✸), 1 (×), 0.1 (◦), and 0.01 (△). The data
are averaged over 50 independent runs. Each run was 106
steps long and the average was taken over 5 · 105 last steps.
Where not shown, the error bars are smaller than symbol size.
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FIG. 7. Average attendance for N = 200 and premium
p = 10 (✸), 1 (×), 0.1 (◦), and 0.01 (△). The data are
averaged over 50 independent runs. Each run was 106 steps
long and the average was taken over 5 · 105 last steps steps.
Where not shown, the error bars are smaller than symbol size.
The memory dependence of attendence fluctuations for
several valuer of p is presented in Fig. 6. In the mini-
mum of fluctuations we recognize the same behavior as
in the Minority game. Here, however, the position of the
minimum depends strongly on the value of the premium.
We can see, that the long-memory phase does not depend
much on the premium. On the other hand, the crowded
phase is strongly influenced by the premium. For smaller
p the crowded phase occurs at longer memories.
In Fig. 7 the dependence of average attendance on M
is shown. We can clearly observe that, as discussed al-
ready with Fig. 4, longer memory supresses the response
of the system to the premium. For shorter memories and
sufficiently small p (for N = 200 it means M ≤ 4 and
4
p ≤ 0.1), we observe an interesting, yet not clearly un-
derstood behavior, characterized by non-monotonic de-
pendence of the average attendance on M .
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FIG. 8. Rescaled attendance fluctuations for premium
p = 0.1 and number of players N = 200 (×), 100 (◦), and 60
(△). The data are averaged over 50 independent runs. Each
run was 106 steps long and the average was taken over 5 · 105
last steps steps. Where not shown, the error bars are smaller
than symbol size.
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FIG. 9. The same as in Fig. 8, but for premium p = 1.
In the minority game the relevant quantities are func-
tions of the scaling variable 2N/N . We tried the same
scaling also in our Escape game. The results for p = 0.1
are in Fig. 8, while the case p = 1 is shown in Fig. 9.
As we already noted, larger p makes the game be behave
more similarly to usual Minority game. Here it is illus-
trated by the fact, that the data collapse is much better
for p = 1 than for p = 0.1. We can also see again that
the in large-memory phase the scaling works very well,
while the crowded phase behaves differently.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced an evolutionary game, which we called
Escape game. The dynamical rules are similar in prici-
ple to the Minority game, but some substantial differencs
occur. We observed that in the large-memory phase the
response to the premium is lower. At the same time, the
behavior is closer to the Minority game, which is quan-
titatively seen in the fact, that the relevant quantities
depend on the scaling variable 2M/N as in the Minority
game. On the other hand, for fixed memory length the
behavior is similar for large premium but different from
it for small premium.
The fact that the players are drawn into the play by the
premium leads to enhanced attendance for high premium.
On the other hand, for small premium the incentive is
not strong enough and the system starts to exhibit a
new dynamical phase, whose character is very close to a
spin-glass.
This result can be qualitatively understood as follows.
The presence of fluctuations makes the game a negative-
sum one, if we neglected the premium. High premium
overweights the negative efect of fluctuations and the
players choose the strategies, which give them highest
possible attendance, irrespectively of fluctuations they
cause. That is why for higher premium both the atten-
dance and its fluctuations grow.
For small premium the fluctuations are disastrous and
the players tend to avoid them by not participating. The
situations, in which there are two groups, one of con-
stantly participating players and second of constantly
non-patricipating ones are suitable for both groups. The
first one receives steadily the small premium, the second
one at least does not loose anything. After some time,
however, the scores of the absent players change so that
they would prefer being in over staying out. At that mo-
ment, the system is reshuffled and another configuration
of participating and non-participating players is found.
The mean period of such reshufflings must be longer for
smaller premium, because in this case the scores change
more slowly. We expect, that the transition occurs at
such a value of the premium, which would correspond
to reshuffling period of order one. So, the “spin-glass”
behavior is purely dynamical in origin.
To sum it up, we can draw a fuzzy line in theM versus
p plane, which encloses the region of both p andM small.
Outside this region the Escape game behaves merely as
a sligt modification of the usual Minorit game, while in-
side we observe qualitatively new features, including the
dynamical “spin-glass” behavior.
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